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The role of the judges in the course of interpretation of law has at times been controversial, not 
just in Bangladesh but also in many other countries. At one extreme, some jurists subscribe to the 
view that the 'law is what the judges say it is', on the other end, some others would say that 
judges are nothing but interpreters of law and they can only apply it (may reluctantly concede 
that they can interpret), but cannot make it. While the theory of separation of powers as 
enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh would lend support to the latter view, on some 
occasions the Judges of the Supreme Court may have leaned somewhat in the direction of 
making law, the Appellate Division (AD) of the Supreme Court's decision in Abdul Mannan 
Bhuiyan and another v State (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 49, has very lucidly charted some territories 
where Judges should refrain from treading, in the course of interpretation of the Constitution and 
other laws. 
In this case, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court (HCD), on the basis of a newspaper 
report, appearing in the Daily Ittefaq, issued a rule under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898 (CrPC) upon, inter alia, the political leaders and Secretary, Ministry of Home 
Affairs to explain why pro-hartal and anti-hartal activities would not be declared as cognizable 
offences. The HCD held that every assembly of five or more persons either to support or desist a 
hartal would be an unlawful assembly under the fifth clause of Section 141 of the Penal Code, 
1860 (if the common object is “by means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel 
any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to 
do.”). It also held that the activities of the members of such an unlawful assembly would be 
cognizable offences under various Sections of part VIII of the Penal Code, depending on their 
actual action/s. 
In the course of the hearing of the appeal against the judgment rendered by the HCD, the 
Attorney General made a fundamental point that since there was no pending judicial proceedings 
which would trigger the exercise of the inherent powers of the HCD, there was no scope for the 
HCD to apply it; and the AD accepted this argument. The AD arrived at this conclusion on the 
basis of the finding that the word 'or' in Section 561A of the CrPC is conjunctive. The AD 
referred to the judgement in Khondaker Modarresh Elahiv Government of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh, (2002) 54 DLR (HCD) 47 and observed that the legality of hartal per se is firmly 
established and was not at all an issue in the case before it. 
Referring to the decision of the US Supreme Court in Myers v United States (1926) 272 U.S. 52, 
the AD observed that the raison d'être of the separation of powers among the organs of the 
government is not efficiency, but the curtailment of arbitrary power by ensuring checks and 
balances. The AD concluded that "[i]t is true that there is no such thing as absolute or 
unqualified separation of power in the sense conceived by Montesquieu, but there is however, a 
well marked and clear cut functional division in the business of the Government, and our 
judiciary is to oversee and protect the overstepping not only of other organs of the Government 
but also of itself." (Para 40) 
If the ratio of this case is followed in its letter and spirit, some needless friction between the 
judiciary and the two other organs of the state would be avoided, avoidable politicisation of the 
judiciary would be averted, and democratic culture in this country would be strengthened. The 
power of judicial review is an indispensable element of the constitutional supremacy and more 
often than not resorting to interpretative tools is an inseparable part of it. However, the power to 
legislate is not necessarily a part of the exercise of judicial review. Judicial activism is lauded by 
many commentators and surely such activism has played a laudable role in the progressive 
development of the society but there is a fine line between activism and traversing in areas 
reserved for the Parliament. It is quite clear that the AD in this case was acutely aware of that 
delicate line and the pitfalls of crossing that line. Such self-restraint has not only helped the AD 
to avoid being dragged into politically sensitive areas but also has helped it to preserve its image 
as an impartial arbiter for settling legal disputes as opposed to political ones. 
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